University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

4-19-1955

Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co.
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co. 44 Cal.2d 321 (1955).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/368

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Apr. 1955]

CROWLEY tJ. MODERN FAUCET MFG. CO.

321

[44 C.2d 321; 282 P.2d 33]

[L. A. No. 23649.

In Bank.

Apr. 19, 1955.]

L. E. CROWLEY, Appellant, v. MODERN FAUCET
MANUFACTURING COMPANY (a Corporation) et aI.,
Respondents.
[1] Judgments-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-A judgment entered after sustaining general demurrer is judgment
on merits to extent that it adjudicates that facts alleged do not
constitute cause of action, and will, accordingly, bar subsequent action alleging same facts.
[2] Id.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-If general demurrer was sustained in first action on ground equally applicable to second, former judgment on such demurrer will bar
second action, though different facts are alleged in second
action.
[S] Id.-Res Judicata-Judgment on Demurrer.-If new or additional facts are alleged in second action which will cure
defects in original pleading, former jUdgment on general demurrer is not bar to subsequent action, whether or not plaintiff
had opportunity to amend his complaint.
[4] Oontracts-Form as Element.-A written memorandum is not
identical with written contract; it is merely evidence of it
and usually does not contain all terms, and use of ward
"memorandum" implies that it is something less than contr&et.
[6] Judgments - Res Judicata - Judgment on Demurrer. - Judgment on demurrer in action based on oral contract is complete
bar to subsequent action alleging that parties "entered into
an exclusive sales agreement," even if plaintiff had inserted
word "written" before phrase "exclusive sales agreement,"
where only writing on which plaintiff can rely is writing that
was before court in first action, plaintiff admits that written
contract relied on in second action is same document that was
attached to prior complamt as exhibit, and both actions arose
out of same transaction, were for same breach of same contract, and involved same facts.
[6] Dismissal-Insufficiency of Pleadings.-It is not abuse of discretion to dismiss action on ground that it is sham and frivolous where plaintiff was given leave to amend first amended
complaint for express purpose of pleading written contract,
[1] Conclusiveness of judgment on demurrer, notes, 13 A.L.R.

1104 j 106 A.L.R. 437. See also Oal.Jur., Judgments, § 184; Am.Jur.,
Pleading, § 251 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3,5] Judgments, § 352; [4] Contracts,
§ 116 j [6] Dismissal, § 23•
.. C.2d-U

I
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and where he declined to do so and sought to relitigate precise
issue that was finally adjudicated against him in prior action.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa
Angeles County. John J. Ford, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for an injunction, an accounting, awl damagea.
Judgment of dismissal affirmed.
Nicolas Ferrara for Appellant.
Myron J. Glauber for Respondents.
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TRAYNOR, J.-On August 3, 1951, plaintifl brought an
action seeking damages for breach of an oral contract. He
alleged in his third amended complaint "That on or about
the 17th day of October 1950 the plaintiff and defendants
entered into an oral agreement" whereby he was given
the exclusive right to buy from defendants certain patented
shower heads. He also alleged that "a written memorandum
of said agreement, signed by the defendants, is set forth in
a letter dated October 17, 1950, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit 'A' and made a part hereof as though set
forth herein in full." A demurrer to this complaint on the
grounds that the written memorandum did not meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds (Civ. Code, § 1624; Code
Civ. Proc., § 1973) was sustained without leave to amend
pursuant to a stipulation that "if the demurrer be sustained,
that it be sustained without leave to amend." Judgm~t was
entered that plaintiff take nothing in the action and that
defendant recover its costs. Plaintiff's appeal from the judgment was dismissed.
On November 12, 1953, plaintiff brought the present action
seeking an injunction, an accounting, and damages. The
complaint alleges that "On or about October 17, 1950, at
Los Angeles County California, plaintiffs and defendants
made and entered into an exclusive sales agreement, and on
said date defendants made, signed and delivered to plaintiffs
their written memorandum of said agreement, wherein and
whereby defendants agreed that they will sell exclusively to
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs agreed that they will purchase exclusively from defendants. . . ." Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss, and the record in the first action offered in support
of the motion was received in evidence. The motion to dismiss
was iranted on the grounds that the alleged agreement ia
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identical with that alleged in the first action, that the prior
judgment is res judicata, and that the action is sham and
frivolous. A judgment of dismissal followed, from which
plaintiff appeals.
[1] The applicable rules are set forth in Keidafz v. Albany,
39 Ca1.2d 826, 828 [249 P.2d 264]: (1) A judgment entered
after a general demurrer has been sustained "is a judgment
on the merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts
alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and will accordingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the same facts."
[2] (2)" [E]ven though different facts may be alleged
in the second action, if the demurrer was sustained in the
first action on a ground equally applicable to the second, the
former judgment will also be a bar." [3] (3) "If, on the
other hand, new or additional facts are alleged that cure
the defects in the original pleading, it is settled that the
former judgment is not a bar to the subsequent action whether
or not plaintiff had an opportunity to amend his complaint."
A comparison of the records in the two actions reveals
that the facts alleged in the present action are substantially
the same as those adjudicated in the first action and that
the case therefore falls squarely within the first rule in the
Keidatz case.
Plaintiff contends that the prior judgment is not res judicata
on the ground that the first action was based on an oral
contract, whereas the present action is for breach of a written
contract. The language of his complaint does not bear out
his contention, but even if it did the result would be the same.
The ·prior complaint alleged an oral contract. The
present complaint omits that allegation but does not expressly
allege a written contract. It merely alleges that the parties
"entered into an exclusive sales agreement" and that defendants "si~'Ded (lnd delivered to plaintiffs a written memorandum" thereof. The written document is referred to only as
a memorandum, and only one party is alleged to have signed
it. [4] A written memorandum is not identical with a
written contract (see Rest., Contracts, § 207): it is merely
evidence of it and usually does not contain all of the
terms. (See 2 Witkin, California Procedure, 1228.) The
very use of the word "memorandum" implies that it is
something less than a contract, and it was apparently in
that sense that the word was used in section 1624 of the
Civil Code and section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff simply alleges that the parties entertd into a sales

)
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agreement and is noncommittal as to whether that agreement is written or oral.
[5] Even if plaintiff had inserted the word "written" before the phrase "exclusive sales agreement" be would llot
have escaped the bar of res judicata. The only writing Oll
whieh plaintiff can rely is the writing that was before the
court in the first action. The motion to dismiss and the
affidavit in support thereof, tendered the issue whether there
were other writings between the parties, and there were no
counteraffidavits. If there were other writings, plaintiff" should have produced them in opposition to the motion.
He was bound to meet the issue tendered by the motion or
abide the results of the heal·jng thereon." (Cunha v. AngloCalifornia Nat. Bank, 34 Ca1.App.2d 383, 392 [93 P.2d 572].)
Moreover, plaintiff admits that the written contract relied on in the present action is the same document that was
attached to the prior complamt as an exhibit. The court
held in the first action that it was not even a memorandum
of a contract, a fortiori it cannot be a written contract. It
was relied on in the first action to comply with the statute
of frauds and was relied on in the present action for the
same purpose. Both actions arose out of the same transaction, both actions were for the same breach of the same
contract, and both involve the same facts. The judgment
in the first action is therefore a complete bar to the present
action. (Keidatz v. Albany, supra, 39 Ca1.2d 826, 828 and
cases cited therein.)
[6] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action on the additional ground that it was sham
and frivolous. Not only was it barred by the judgment in
the first action, but in that action plaintiff was given leave
to amend his first amended complaint for the express purpose
of pleading a written contract. lIe deliberately declined to
do so and stipulated that "if the demurrer be sustained that
it be sustained without leave to amend." In the present
action he sought to avoid the effect of the former adjudication
by failing to disclose in his complaint that the document upon
which he now relies was the same document that was before
the trial court in the first action and there beld insufficient
to comply with the statute of frauds. When it appeared
without dispute in this action that plaintiff was in fact seeking to relitigate the precise issue that was finally adjudicated
against him in the former action, the trial court properly
exercised its power to stop vexatious litigation, clearly with-

)

out merit, and burdensom(l to the courts as well as to defendants. (OunlLa v. ..4.nglo-California Nat. Bank, s'upra, 34
Cal.App.2d 383, 388-391; Neal v. Bank of America, 93 Cal.
App.2d 678, 682 [209 P.2d 825] ; McKenna v. Elliott & Horns
00., 118 Cal.App.2d 551, 555 [258 P.2d 528].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J'J Schauer
J., and Spence, J'J concurred.

